Game of deals: bargaining behaviour of the European Parliament in the Brexit process
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2023 |
| Druh | Článek v odborném periodiku |
| Časopis / Zdroj | Journal of Legislative Studies |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| www | https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13572334.2023.2233202 |
| Doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2023.2233202 |
| Klíčová slova | European parliament; Brexit; Withdrawal Agreement; Trade and Cooperation Agreement;bargaining strategies; rational institutionalism |
| Popis | The article provides an in-depth analysis of the various bargaining strategiesthat the European Parliament (EP) used to leverage its influence over thenegotiations of the Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade and CooperationAgreement. More specifically, it focuses onfive bargaining self-empowermentstrategies (obstructing, movingfirst, issue-linking, allying with other actors,and mobilising public opinion), elucidating if, how and to what extent the EPwas using these strategies vis-a-vis the Brexit process. Conceptually, thearticle rests on the theory of bargaining-based rational institutionalism. Theanalysis covers almost afive year period, from the announcement of the in/out referendum results on 24 June 2016 until 27 April 2021 when the EPconsented to the conclusion of the TCA. The data used for the analysis comefrom a number of sources, including 17 original interviews and emailcommunications with MEPs. |
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