Empowering irrigation: A game-theoretic approach to electricity utilization in Indian agriculture
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2016 |
| Druh | Článek v odborném periodiku |
| Časopis / Zdroj | Utilities Policy |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| www | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0957178716302685 |
| Doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2016.10.002 |
| Obor | Ekonomie |
| Klíčová slova | Demand-side management; Network externality; Common-pool resource; Energy–water nexus; Electricity |
| Popis | This research uses a game-theoretic approach to analyze electric power provision for irrigation in Andhra Pradesh, based on results from interview and survey data. Farmers face a coordination problem of collectively preserving electric power quality and a linked dilemma of obtaining sufficient electric infrastructure capacity from utilities. Low equilibria prevail due to asymmetric payoffs and farmers not knowing electric network properties. The findings derived from survey data, empirical tests, and model synthesis indicate how the capacity dilemma can be overcome to enable coordinated technology adoption via farmers' and utilities’ investment into energy-efficient and economically viable technology. Coordinated demand-side measures could effectively reduce energy use and support adaptation to climate change. |