Rewards for Local Partisans. The Pork Barrel Politics in Slovakia.
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2015 |
| Druh | Další prezentace na konferencích |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| Popis | Distribution of resources is an essential part of politics and vast research has been done in this field. While the allocation of public money is primarily of an economic nature, the literature shows that political representatives tend to use it for rewarding their allies while punishing their rivals. This paper provides an analysis of a program of local grants in Slovakia in the period between 2004 and 2014. Its main aims include tracking the development of the distribution of grants and studying its electoral consequences. The results clearly show that shortly after its introduction the funding program developed from a rather neutral instrument into a mechanism used by governments for their own partisan interests. The cabinets use the distribution of grants to reward towns with local leadership from the ruling parties mainly at the expense of representatives from the opposition. What is more, the subsidies are beneficial for mayors when seeking reelection. A greater number of grants awarded during one term or grants distributed at the end of the electoral cycle help mayors to an even greater extent. Hence the paper demonstrates that a program paid by all taxpayers may easily turn into a mechanism fueled by political interests with an impact in the electoral arena. |